A n approach t o requirements specification and subsequent verification of designs for embedded, real-time systems is presented. A system is given by a conventional mathematical model for a dynamic system, where application specific state variables denote total finctions of real time. Specifications are formulas in a real-time, interval temporal logic, where atomic predicates define durations of states. Requirements are specified by a conjunction of formulas, which reflect safety and functionality constraints on the total system. A design specifies the behaviour of components and the conjunction of component specifications can be shown to imply the requirements. Designs can be refined in a similar fashion.
Introduction
Requirements engineering [4] for software that controls physical systems must investigate safety and functional requirements for the system as a whole. Requirements typically delimit expected behaviours over time for a combination of given physical processes with planned sensors, actuators and programmed computers. Requirements engineering is ideally completed with precise specifications for components and the design binding them together. This paper illustrates an approach to requirements engineering which has evolved during our work with case studies within the Provably Correct Systems (ProCoS) project [l, 131.
The approach uses a conventional time-domain model of mathematical systems theory or control engineering [12] and develops predicates describing properties of a total system in three steps:
2.
A control model extends the system model with an explicit control strategy. The strategy is verified to imply the requirements under a set of assumptions about the intended environment of use.
3.
A design model for a distributed system defines separate specifications for a set of interface units and programs. Interface units relate system states to event values under certain timing and approximation constraints. Programs implement the control strategy by controlling timing and order of events, and by computing relevant event values.
The approach is based on refinement of models. Each refinement removes some freedom (choice, nondeterminism) by adding further constraints. At each stage the resulting model is verified to be contained in (or imply) the model of the previous stage.
The following sections introduce the specification language, and then discuss the system and control models with associated refinements in more detail, using a simple Railway Level Crossing as a running example. The approach has also been used on a simple Auto Pilot [14] (example due to Boyer and Moore) and on a Gas Burner [ll].
Specification language
A system is described by a collection of state variables which are functions of Time, modelled by the real numbers. Properties of systems are expressed by constraints on the state variables. We wish to express requirements and design without explicit mentioning of time instants, and introduce a notation which is a real-time, interval logic [9] based on state durations: The Duration Calculus [Z]. 
Syntax

Durations and duration terms
For any state assertion P , s P is a duration. A duration ternt (of type R) is a duration, a real constant, a real static variable or the term o p ( q , . . . , y,), where op is; an n-ary operator symbol of type R and rl, . . . , r, are duration terms.
The symbol .t is used as an abbreviation for the duration te:rm J'tt.
Duration formulas
If A is any n-ary predicate symbol on R and q , . . . , r, are duration terms, then A(q, . . . , r,) is an atomic duration formula. Atomic duration formulas, the symbols true and false, (~D I ) ,
and (V x)Dll, where x is a static variable and D1, 2 ) 2 are duration formulas, are dumtion formulas of type Bool. We use standard abbreviation A, j , U for both state assertions and duration formulas, and we introduce abbreviations for commonly used duration formulas:
Abbreviaition Formula
Legend
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The following precedence rules are used holds from start for every behaviour B.
Specifications and refinement
A specification for a, system is a duration formula 2). A behaviour €3 satisfies the specification if D holds from start for 8. For specifications 2 )~ and 2 ) 2 we say, that 2 ) 2 is a refinement of 2)1 if any behaviour satisfying 2 ) 2 also satisfy D1. It follows, that V2 is a refinement of 2)1 if the duration formula 232
2)1 is valid.
Proof system, Verification
It is almost certain, that the general Duration calculus is undecidable, and hence we cannot expect to find a complete set of axioms and proof rules. The proofs in this paper may, however, be based on the set of axioms and prooif rules given below. In the following, P denotes a state assertion, r a non-negative real number and 2) denotes a formula in the Duration Calculus.
Axiom 1 J'#= 0 Axiom 2 s P 2 0 Axiom 3
Axiom4 ( J P = r l ) ; ( J P = n ) * J P = n + 4
Axiom 5 If PI U P2 is a valid state assertion then JP1 = JP2 is an axiom
The following induction rule is sound due to the finite variability of states.
Induction Rule If D ( [ l is provable, and
It has a dual, backward induction rule.
3 System model The first step in formalising requirements to a system is to construct a system model. Requirements are constraints on this mod,el. This section builds a system model for our running example: A railway level crossing.
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Informal description
The following informal description is based on the description found in [ l o ] and on discussions with engineers from DSB (Danish National Railways):
The railway level crossing is a crossing between a single track railway and a road. For simplicity it is assumed that all trains passing the crossing will travel in the same direction. The crossing is shown in figure 1.
--
Approaching Passing
Figure 1: Railway Crossing Road traffic is controlled by a gate at each side of the railway. The gates close only when road traffic is not stuck in the crossing.
Train traffic is controlled by a signal on the side of the tracks along which the trains approach. The signal indicates: "stop" or "go" for oncoming trains.
Sensors keep track of trains in the system. A sensor is placed in a reasonable distance from the signal such that a train will reach the first sensor point before it reaches the signal. A train enters the system, whenever it is determined by this sensor. A train has left the crossing, whenever the sensors determine that the rear end of the train has passed the crossing.
When a train approaches, the gates are closed, provided road traffic is not stuck in the crossing. The signal is only set to "go" after the gates have closed.
When no trains are approaching or passing, the signal must be set to "stop" and the gates opened.
The main objective of the system controlling the gates and the signal is to ensure safety: The system must never allow train and road traffic to pass the crossing at the same time.
Furthermore, the system must ensure that both road traffic and trains are able to pass the crossing within some reasonable time.
The device that controls the system is the Railway Crossing Control System (RCS). The RCS gets input data from the train sensors and the gate sensors, and sends commands to the signal and the gates.
State variables
trains.
The Signal can be "stop" (8) or "go" ( t t )
The state models a signal, gates, road traffic and
The gates can be open, closed, opening or closing Gates : {open, closed, opening, closing)
The road traffic can be stopped at the crossing, be stuck in the crossing or be free to cross 
Requirements
The requirements concern safety and function
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Safety requirement
If the gates are not closed or road traffic is stuck in the crossing, the trains must not pass
Functional requirements
The road traffic should maximally be held back for a predefined period of time, Tstopped We now turn to selecting the assumptions and a control strettegy, such that the controlled system can be proved to satisfy the requirements under the given assumpt.ions.
Ass,umptions
The assumptions constrain the system environment. In the case of the railway level crossing, it is necessary tlo constrain the behaviour of both the road traffic and the trains, as well as the devices 2 5 3 
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3. The last train in a series of trains passes the crossing before leaving the crossing 
4. The signal switches between "stop" and "go"
Control strategy
The control strategy is selected by the system designer with the purpose of defining an implementable control satisfying the requirements under the assumptions. The following strategy is a formalisation of the obvious finite state control, cycling through phases with passive, approaching and passing trains. This is expressed by the predicate 
Verification of requirements
In order to verify that the formal specification of the Control System satisfies the requirements, one must prove: A S M A R C S =+-Req.
The verifications all have the same structure: From an arbitrary interval, where the antecedent part of the requirement holds, it is shown through several steps of deduction that the consequent holds. The assumptions and the control strategy can be used freely in the deduction, since they all hold for an arbitrary interval (the 0 distributes over conjunction). Since it is shown to hold for an arbitrary interval it also holds for any subinterval.
The safety requirement
The safety requirement is verified without any timing constraints
The functional requirements
The proof of the first functional requirement ensuring the flow of the road traffic relies on the maximum opening and closing times for the gates, and the calculated maximum time the gates can be closed: The time that the gates are closed is limited by a sum of the time the gates are closed before the signal indicates "go", the active time with the signal on "go", the time the signal is after the trains have left the crossing, and finally the time the gates can be closed while the system is inactive
where Tclosed = Tnts + Tsched + Tinactive + Twait Thus, we should choose Tstopped such that:
The second and third functional requirements are proved in a similar manner.
Refining the control model
The control model presented above (from now on referred t o as RCSO) specified a set of properties of the control system. This control model can be refined to introduce a less abstract control model (RCSl), a design. In this model, the control system is defined by describing the communication between a controlling processor and some interface units. 
Informal description
Conclusion
We have illustrated an approach to requirements engineering for real-time systems using a mathematical specification of system requirements and system design, where a design is verified by calculations. In the first stage a system model is built. Requirements for the system together with assumptions for the system environiment are stated. A control model is then constructed, and it is proved that the control model satisfies the requirements whenever the assumptions hold. Desigin for a particular control system is then introduced and verified to preserve the properties of the control model. The end result is a set of verified specifications, which clearly expresses the responsibilities of component implementors.
In further refinement steps towards concrete programs, we need to know the relationship between programming language semantics and duration formulas. In [3] the Dluration Calculus is used t o give a realtime semant.ics to communicating sequential processes and also gives various specifications of schedulers for shared processors. Furthermore, the Duration Calculus has in [7] been used to give semantics to circuits, to prove the correctness of a circuit transformation, and to give a precise definition of delay-insensitive circuits. Current work is going on to extend Duration Calculus to a version with probabilities [8] as well as to mechanise the calculations using existing theorem provers.
